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RESPONDENTS' RESPONSE TO TRUGREEN'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents provide only the following limited response to certain
mischaracterizations of the record contained in TruGreen's statement of facts:
1.

The certified questions were not predicated on any finding of liability by

the District Court on TruGreen's breach of contract or tortious interference claims. To
the contrary, the issue of liability has not been decided, as the District Court explained in
noting the causation and damages deficiencies in TruGreen's remaining claims:
TruGreen has failed to provide the court with evidence that would raise a
reasonable inference supporting causation and damages. TruGreen has
failed to provide any admissible evidence that shows a causal connection
between TruGreen's alleged damages and the alleged wrongful conduct of
the Defendants.
R.286 at 8 (emphasis added).1
2.

While TruGreen argues that all of its sales training, marketing and financial

information, and business practices are confidential, TruGreen's Brief at 7, the District
Court made no determination whether any such information is confidential. R.253, 286.
Moreover, there was no evidence that the former TruGreen employees took or used any
allegedly confidential information. R.184 at xi-xii.
3.

Contrary to TruGreen's assertion, before hiring Mantz or the other former

TruGreen employees, Mower Brothers did not have knowledge of the terms of these
employees' agreements with TruGreen. R.201 at xxvii-xxx. There also is no evidence
1

TruGreen stated in its initial brief that it was "faced with the practicality of
arguing the merits of restitution on relatively few written findings of liability (especially
with the [sic] respect to Respondents' tortious conduct)." TruGreen's Brief at 6.
Contrary to TruGreen's assertion, there were no written findings of liability.
1
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that Mower Brothers pursued Mantz or other TruGreen employees with the intent to
acquire and exploit TruGreen's marketing and training expertise or to cripple TruGreen's
business. No evidence of any wrongful purpose or wrongful means was presented.
R. 184 at 12-13; 206 at 33-36. Mower Brothers hired the former TruGreen employees to
fill its available positions and not to harm or damage TruGreen. R.184 at Exh. 2, Tf 35.
4.

TruGreen mischaracterizes its applicable employment agreements as

"liquidated damages covenants" that "operate as a contractual measure of restitution."
TruGreen's Brief at 44-45. The clause relied on by TruGreen instead merely provides:
In the event of a breach or threatened breach by me of any provision of this
Agreement, the damages which TruGreen might suffer would be difficult or
impossible to measure and, therefore, TruGreen shall be entitled to an
injunction restraining me from 1) using or disclosing TruGreen's customer
list(s) and/or Confidential Business information, and 2) diverting or
soliciting any customer or customers of TruGreen in violation of the
Agreement. Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting TruGreen
from pursuing any other remedies available to it for such breach or
threatened breach including, but not limited to, the recovery of damages
from me in an amount equal to the revenues gained by or from the breach.
R.180 at Att. # 1, Exh. 9 ^ 6 (Mantz's 4/19/93 agreement); R.188 at Att. # 1, Exh. 2 U 6
(Stephenson's 1/2/03 agreement); R.188 at Att. # 2, Exh. 2 ^ 6 (LeBlanc's 2/4/02
agreement) (emphasis added).
This clause is not in any employment agreement that is binding on any remaining
defendant. Instead, it is found only in the employment agreements of Mantz, Stephenson,
and LeBlanc, cited above, which were superseded by subsequent TruGreen employment
agreements that lack this language. R.253 at 32-33.

2
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5.

The District Court dismissed TruGreen's claim for punitive damages,

holding that TruGreen was not entitled to punitive damages as a matter of law:
TruGreen has failed to demonstrate additional aggravating circumstances,
and the facts of this case are not so unusual or outrageous as to justify
punitive damages. Consequently, the court eliminates punitive damages as
a form of potential recovery for TruGreen.
R.253 at 43-44.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE REMEDY FOR BREACH OF AN EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IS
THE EMPLOYER'S ACTUAL LOST PROFITS RESULTING FROM THE
BREACH.
A.

Utah Law Disallows Contractual Remedies Founded in Restitution or
Unjust Enrichment

The Court should reject TruGreen's new theory that "restitution" is a contractual
remedy entitling it to respondents' revenues or profits, founded on what TruGreen
describes as a purported "sea [of] change in the contract theory of damages." See
TruGreen's Brief at 40. This Court—along with courts in most jurisdictions—has not
subscribed to such a proposition. Rather, as TruGreen admits, it is hornbook law that
"contract damages are generally compensatory and not restitutionary." Id.
Indeed, this Court has already held that contractual remedies must center on the
nonbreaching party's expectation interest, which does not give rise to restitution. See
Respondents' Opening Brief, Point 1(A) (citing Ford v. American Express Fin. Advisors,
Inc., 2004 UT 70, f 39, 98 P.3d 15, and other Utah authority). This Court recognizes that
contract law "avoid[s] putting the plaintiff in a better position than he would have
occupied but for the breach," Ford, 2004 UT 70 at \ 37, and also avoids punishing the
3
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breaching party, see Anesthesiologists Assocs. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 884 P.2d 1236,
1238 (Utah 1994). It is also well settled by this Court that "unjust enrichment" or
"restitution" are equitable remedies, unavailable when there is a written contract. See
Respondents' Opening Brief, Point 1(B) (citing American Towers Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v.
CCI Mechanical Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1192-93 (Utah 1996), Mann v. American W. Life
Ins. Co., 586 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1978), and other Utah authorities).
Resorting instead to other jurisdictions, TruGreen ignores these prior decisions
altogether, which answer TruGreen's rhetorical question of "Why then is the
disgorgement remedy not seen more often in contract law?" TruGreen's Brief at 41.
Under controlling Utah law, the first certified question regarding contractual remedies
should be answered in respondents' favor.
B,

Courts in Most Other Jurisdictions Recognize That Restitution is Not a
Contractual Remedy for Breach of Employment Covenants,

Even if it were necessary to look beyond Utah's borders—but it is unnecessary—a
supermajority of cases from jurisdictions across the country, both old and new, confirm
that restitution is unavailable for breach of a restrictive covenant in an employment
agreement. See Respondents' Opening Brief, Point 1(C) (citing authorities from
throughout United States recognizing lost profits alone as employer's remedy for breach
of restrictive covenants in employment agreements). The two cases cited by TruGreen
applying only Minnesota law do not overcome the overwhelming authority from other
jurisdictions that should lead the Court to resolve the first certified question by holding
that restitution is not a remedy in Utah for breach of contractual employment covenants.
4
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1.

The Cherne Case from Minnesota Recognized Restitution as a
Remedy for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, a Claim TruGreen
Has Not Pled Here.

TruGreen's reliance on Cherne Industries, Inc. v. Grounds & Associates, Inc., 278
N.W.2d 81 (Minn. 1979) (cited in TruGreen's Brief at 42), is misplaced. In Cherne,
where the employer prevailed against former employees for breach of a non-compete
agreement and for misappropriation of trade secrets, the court awarded damages equal to
10% of the former employees' profits. Id. at 95. However, the court failed to specify
whether the award was based on breach of contract or trade secrets misappropriation. Id.
This distinction is important here because TruGreen never asserted a claim for
misappropriation of trade secrets. R.l 15 (TruGreen's Amended Complaint).
The Cherne court recognized that the employee's gain may be recovered as
damages for trade secrets misappropriation, id. at 94 (citing Dobbs, Remedies § 10.5, at
693), which is the law in Utah, but also ratified the traditional rule that contract damages
are measured by the nonbreaching party's loss of expected benefits under the contract, id.
at 94 (citing Dobbs, Remedies § 12.1). Based on Cherne s failure to explain whether its
damages award was for breach of contract or trade secrets misappropriation, and

Pursuant to section 13-24-4 of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, damages can
include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused
by misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. See also
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 396 ("[A]fter the termination of the agency, the
agent... has a duty to account for profits made by the sale or use of trade secrets.").
However, TruGreen has not asserted a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets.
5
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TruGreen's failure to plead a trade secrets claim, Cherne should not impact the resolution
of the first certified question in respondents' favor.
2.

Storage Technology, Applying Minnesota Law, was a Tortious
Interference Case, and thus is Inapposite to the Breach of Contract
Issue Before the Court.

There is no merit to TruGreen's contention that Storage Technology Corp. v.
Cisco Systems, Inc., 395 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 2005), stands for the proposition that "courts
in some jurisdictions recognize restitution as an appropriate remedy for breaches of noncompetition and non-disclosure covenants." TruGreen's Brief at 42. Storage Technology
was a tortious interference case and not a breach of contract case. The employer in
Storage Technology asserted only Minnesota state law tort claims against its competitor
for inducing employees to breach non-compete agreements and a duty of loyalty to their
former employer. See Storage Technology., 395 F.3d at 922 (identifying employer's
claim as "interference with contractual relations, inducing breach of contract, conversion,
and breach of fiduciary duties"). The court also stated in dicta that the "remedy for
breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is also restitutionary" in Minnesota. Id, at 925
(citation omitted). However, TruGreen has not asserted a breach of duty claim, R.l 15
3

The Cherne court also stated that it previously had found that "the violator of a
covenant not to compete may be required to account for his profits, and such illegal
profits may properly measure the damages." Cherne, 278 N.W.2d at 94-95 (citing
Peterson v. Johnson Nut Co., 297 N.W. 178, 182 (Minn. 1941), but also citing National
School Studios, Inc. v. Superior School Photo Service, Inc., 242 P.2d 756 (Wash. 1952),
which awarded no damages because plaintiff had failed to prove lost profits). The court
in Peterson did not provide any analysis or case authority regarding the proper measure
of damages for breach of a non-compete agreement, but merely held that evidence of the
defendant's revenue and profit supported the finding that plaintiffs damages were at least
$500.
6
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(TruGreen's Amended Complaint), so Storage Technology's dicta about such a claim is
inapplicable here.
C.

A Defendant's Gains Can Only Serve as a Proxy for Plaintiffs Lost
Profits When Those Gains Are Derived from the Plaintiffs Actual
Customers.

While a defendant's gains usually are irrelevant to assessing a plaintiffs losses
occasioned by breach of a restrictive covenant, in some cases courts have held that a
defendant's profits may "be considered, in evidence, if shown to correspond, in whole or
in part, with the loss of plaintiff." Dunn v. Ward, 670 P.2d 59, 61 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983).
TruGreen's own cases confirm the rule that a defendant's gains can only be used to
determine a plaintiffs loss to the extent such gains come from the plaintiffs former or
prospective customers, and that the court does not look at the defendant's gains from all
sources.4 Because a defendant's gains from sales to individuals who were never
plaintiffs customers does not serve as a proxy for plaintiffs losses caused by defendant's
breach in this case, a court should not consider such gains.

4

See Respondents' Opening Brief at 20-22 nn.9-10 (citing multiple authorities); see also
North Pac. Lumber Co. v. Moore, 551 P.2d 431, 435-36 (Or. 1976) ("From the record it
appears that [a former employee], in breach of the contract with plaintiff, made sales to
plaintiffs former customers which would otherwise have been made by plaintiff and that
plaintiff thereby suffered a loss of profits. We agree with the trial court that [a former
employee's new employer's] profits from such sales are a reasonable basis for estimating
plaintiffs damages."); Merager v. Turnbull, 99 P.2d 434, 439 (Wash. 1949) (noting first
that measure of damages for breach of non-compete agreement is "not the profits which a
defendant realized in violation of an agreement" but considering defendants' gains
because "the gains of [defendant] coincide with the loss sustained by the [plaintiff]
during the period [defendants] breached the restrictive covenant").
7
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Yet, TruGreen has not shown that any of the employee defendants had profits—
much less profits derived from the employees' former customers at TruGreen. R.286 at 8
(June 8, 2006 Order) ("In fact, TruGreen has failed to produce any evidence of what
damage to TruGreen is attributable to any of the Defendants"); see also R.240 at 99
(expert Derk G. Rasmussen opining, after comparing TruGreen and Mower Brothers'
customer lists, that there has been no customer crossover due to alleged actions of
respondents). Instead, TruGreen has sought to recover all of Mower Brothers' gross
revenues. R.178 at iv.
Not only does this improper damages theory based on Mower Brothers' revenues
or profits fail to correspond to any actual loss of TruGreen, as the District Court held,
R.286 at 8, but it also does not apply where TruGreen's contract claims are against its
former employees, and not against Mower Brothers. Evidence of Mower Brothers'
revenue or profit from sales to former customers—if TruGreen had such evidence, which
it does not have, R.240 at 99—could not be considered as a proxy for TruGreen's lost
profits allegedly caused by each former employee. Indeed, even under the clause
specified by TruGreen, see Response to SOF \ 4, above, only evidence of each
employee's gains could properly be considered as a proxy for TruGreen's lost profits
caused by that employee's breaches—evidence that TruGreen also lacks. TruGreen has
no evidence that any employee brought to Mower Brothers any customer he contacted
while at TruGreen. R.233 at 23. As a result, TruGreen's analysis should be rejected.

8
SLC 140835

D,

The Remaining Employment Agreements Before the Court Do Not
Provide the Remedy TruGreen Proposes,

TruGreen argues that there is a "liquidated damages" provision in certain
employment agreements at issue that provides, contractually, the remedy of restitution.
This argument should be rejected on several grounds.
1.

The Provision in Question is Found Only in Agreements That Have
Been Superseded and No Longer are Binding on Any Employee
Defendant.

The provision relied on by TruGreen to support its "liquidated damages" argument
is not found in any agreements still in force. The complete language provides:
In the event of a breach or threatened breach by me of any provision of this
Agreement, the damages which TruGreen might suffer would be difficult or
impossible to measure and, therefore, TruGreen shall be entitled to an
injunction restraining me from 1) using or disclosing TruGreen's customer
list(s) and/or Confidential Business information, and 2) diverting or
soliciting any customer or customers of TruGreen in violation of the
Agreement. Nothing herein shall be construed as prohibiting TruGreen
from pursuing any other remedies available to it for such breach or
threatened breach including, but not limited to, the recovery of damages
from me in an amount equal to the revenues gained by or from the breach.
See Respondents' Response to TruGreen's Statement of Facts at ^f 4, above. This
language is only found in three employees5 agreements, which have been superseded by
later agreements not containing such language. See id. Thus, TruGreen's argument is
moot and should be rejected.
2.

The Interpretation of the So-Called "Liquidated Damages
Covenants" Has Not Been Certified and Should Not Be Considered.

The Court should not consider TruGreen's "liquidated damages" argument
anyway because it is not properly before the Court. The first certified question does not
9
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relate to the interpretation of any contractual liquidated damages provision, but simply
three other contractual covenants. See Order of Acceptance. TruGreen urges the Court
to go beyond the certified question by raising a collateral issue of contract interpretation
that the District Court did not certify and this Court did not accept.
3.

The Language of the Provision in Question Does Not Permit a
Remedy That Is Otherwise Unavailable Under Utah Law.

If the Court were to consider TruGreen's "liquidated damages" argument (and
even if the language in question were contained in a binding agreement, which is not the
case), the provision still fails to support the view that restitution is available for breach of
the three restrictive covenants before the Court. First, the provision is not a liquidated
damages clause. It does not create any new breach-of-contract remedy, but instead only
allows TruGreen to pursue remedies "available to it for such a breach," and lost profits is
the sole remedy available at law for breach of a restrictive employment covenant. See
Point 1(A), (B), (C), above.
Second, if this provision provided a new contractual remedy, which it does not do,
the requirement of causation is still embedded in the provision, which requires that the
profits be "gained by or from the breach," and the District Court has already determined
as a matter of law that "TruGreen has failed to provide the court with evidence that would
raise a reasonable inference supporting causation and damages." R.286 at 8.
Third, evidence of a defendant's profit may be considered only "if shown to
correspond, in whole or in part, with the loss of plaintiff," Dunn, 670 P.2d at 61, which
TruGreen has not shown. See Point 1(C), above.
10
SLC 140835

Last, in a case like this where the harm to TruGreen, if any, is readily
ascertainable, construing this language as a liquidated damages clause still would not,
under Utah law, provide to TruGreen anything more than its actual damages caused by
the alleged breach. See Robbins v. Findlay, 645 P.2d 623, 635-36 (Utah 1982) (noting
that to be enforceable, a liquidated damages provision must be "based on a reasonable
relation to actual damages" and damages must be very difficult of estimation).
Ultimately, TruGreen failed in its burden to show the District Court some proof of
causation and actual damages from alleged contract breaches, and has failed to show any
reason for the Court to create a new remedy that neither exists in Utah nor in the vast
majority of other jurisdictions. The Court should resolve the first certified question by
relying on its prior decisions and ruling in Respondents' favor.
II.

THE REMEDY FOR TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH
CONTRACTUAL OR ECONOMIC RELATIONS IS LOST PROFITS.
Utah law allows only lost profit damages for tortious interference, and other

jurisdictions addressing the issue overwhelmingly agree. See Respondents' Opening
Brief at Point II. Ignoring precedent from Utah and other persuasive authority, TruGreen
resorts to a number of cases from other jurisdictions containing significantly different
facts, which are not persuasive and are otherwise insufficient to overcome the weight of
Utah authority establishing that lost profits damages are the appropriate remedy for
tortious interference.

11
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A.

TruGreen's Own Authorities Do Not Recognize Restitution as an
Appropriate Remedy for Tortious Interference,

The tortious interference cases cited in TruGreen's brief are distinguishable and
should not preclude the Court from recognizing well-settled Utah law that the remedy for
tortious interference is lost profits—and not restitution. TruGreen's authorities are
distinguished in detail below.
1.

TruGreen's Ohio Authority Recognizes That a Plaintiff Explicitly
Seeking Only Restitution Should Be Denied Such Relief.

Where a plaintiff fails to prove its own lost profits due to alleged tortious
interference (seeking instead only unjust enrichment), TruGreen's own authority
recognizes that no recovery can be awarded. TruGreen attempts to distinguish the case of
Developers Three v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990),
cited by respondents, but ignores language in the later Ohio case on which TruGreen
relies, Try Hours, Inc. v. Swartz, 2007 Ohio 1328 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007) (cited in
TruGreen's Brief at 32), where the same Ohio court squarely confirmed the applicability
of the Developers Three rule to facts analogous to those present here:
[T]he holding in Developers Three is clearly limited to situations wherein
the plaintiff seeks recovery on the basis of unjust enrichment. [In]
Developers Three, the plaintiff explicitly was not seeking a recovery on the
basis of lost profits. Hence, the Tenth District was charged with
determining whether the plaintiff could disgorge defendant of its profits
pursuant to a theory of unjust enrichment, rather than upon a "lost profits"
basis. Ultimately, the court rejected the plaintiffs theory of recovery on
the basis of unjust enrichment, "plaintiffs correct measure of damages in
this tortious interference action is the plaintiffs loss (including lost profits)
that arises out of the tortious interference, not the defendant's gain," and
affirmed a compensatory damages method of recovery.

12
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Id. at \ 27 (citing Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1136) (emphasis added).
The instant case is similar. TruGreen freely admits on its third attempt to state
damages that it sought to recover all of Mower Brothers' gains, without attempting to
prove its lost profits. See TruGreen's Brief at 4 (acknowledging that its theory was not
"sort of a lost profit damage calculation" but rather a theory of restitution). The District
Court properly held "that TruGreen has failed to provide the court with evidence that
would raise a reasonable inference supporting causation and damages." R.286 at 8 (June
8, 2006 Order). Thus, as in Developers Three, and as confirmed by Try Hours,
TruGreen's "unjust enrichment" theory should be rejected, and the second certified
question should be answered in respondents' favor.
2.

TruGreen's Leading Cases Allowing Restitution Involve Other
Claims in Addition to Tortious Interference.

The cases primarily relied on by TruGreen permit an award of restitution for
claims that are not at issue in this case, and thus do not support TruGreen's position that
this Court should authorize such a remedy in Utah for tortious interference.
National Merchandising Corp. v. Leyden, 348 N.E.2d 771 (Mass. 1976), was not
limited to tortious interference claims. Instead, restitution was granted as a civil
contempt sanction against the defendants for failing to obey a consent decree and for
inducing another to disobey the consent decree. The court specifically noted that the
defendants "knowingly abetted the violation of a decree and could very likely have been
charged themselves with civil contempt which can readily entail a disgorging of profits
by the contemnor." Id. at 432. Other courts, including those in Massachusetts, have
13
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noted the limited reach of National Merchandising. See, e.g., Buster v. George W.
Moore, Inc., 1997 Mass. App. LEXIS 1195 (refusing to consider National Merchandising
in tortious interference action because damages in National Merchandising "flowed from
the violations of the consent decree"); Commonwealth v. Charlett, 481 Pa. 22, 35 n.l
(1978) (citing National Merchandising for "discussion and application of unjust
enrichment theory to fines imposed for civil contempt").
Storage Technology, addressed in Point 1(B)(2), above, did involve a plaintiff
seeking restitution for tortious interference, but each of plaintiff s claims was rejected on
summary judgment for lack of proof of damages.5 See Storage Tech., 395 F.3d at 923.
Applying Minnesota law, the court recognized that damages for tortious interference with
contract are limited to the amount the plaintiff could have recovered under the underlying
contract—i.e., lost profits. Id. at 923-25.
5

Storage Technology's expert concluded that "Cisco's valuation of NuSpeed
(basically, its key people and storage technology expertise) was $450 million and
represents a proper valuation of the damages to Storage Technology and due to it for the
trade secret appropriation, corporate raiding, and breach of contract and fiduciary
responsibilities promulgated." Storage Tech., 395 F.3d at 926. The trial court rejected
the expert's opinion as "rank speculation." The appellate court agreed, finding that the
expert "attributed the entire value of the NuSpeed acquisition to employees and trade
secrets wrongfully appropriated from Storage Technology, even though NuSpeed had
other assets and employees," and "did not attempt to value the people or the technology
supposedly belonging to Storage Technology by any means other than by ascertaining
what price Cisco paid for NuSpeed." Id. The court held that Storage Technology's
failure to produce evidence substantiating any amount of damages or restitution is fatal to
its tortious interference with contractual relations claim and its other claims. Id. at 929.
The only restitution discussion in Storage Technology explained (in dicta since the
claims failed), citing Cherne (already distinguished in Point 1(B)(1), above), that
Minnesota courts would allow restitution if the interference induced an employee's
breach of non-competition and nondisclosure covenants and fiduciary duties. Id. at 926,
14
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TruGreen similarly failed to present evidence substantiating its unjust enrichment
theory. Because all claims in Storage Technology failed and because TruGreen never
brought a breach of duty claim, see Point 1(B)(2), above, this case is not supporting
authority for TruGreen's restitution theory.
3.

TruGreen9s Cases Can Be Read as Considering a Defendant's Gains
Only to Reflect the Plaintiffs Lost Profits.

The remaining out-of-state cases relied on by TruGreen to support its argument
that restitution should be available under Utah law for tortious interference seem to
consider the defendant's gains solely as a proxy for the plaintiffs lost profits. This
authority does not change the well-settled Utah authority that lost profits is the remedy
for tortious interference. See Respondents' Opening Brief at Point 11(A), (B).
In Sandare Chemical Co. v. WAKO International, Inc., 820 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991),6 the award at issue was a lost profits calculation. In Sandare, the trial court
awarded Nuclear "WAKO's proportionate share of Sandare's profits subsequently
derived from Sandare's manufacture and sale of the test." Id. This "proportionate share"
equaled WAKO's losses from Sandare's tortious interference—the amount WAKO
would have received if it could have gone forward with its own existing contract. Thus,
the court awarded Nuclear—as WAKO's assignee—nothing more than WAKO's share of
the proceeds in the sale of the tests, i.e. WAKO's own lost profits.

6

Other jurisdictions have refused to follow the language cited in Sandare and
disallowed a plaintiff a disgorgement remedy. See, e.g., Robert Plan Corp. v. Onebeacon
Ins., 809 N.Y.S.2d 483 (N.Y. Misc. 2005).
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In National Merchandising, the court arguably only used the defendants' gains as
a proxy for proving the plaintiffs losses as a contempt sanction. After explaining that the
measure of damages for tortious interference is "the loss of advantages .. . which, but for
such interference the plaintiff would have been able to attain or enjoy," the court allowed
recovery based on the defendants' net gains—an "approximation" of the plaintiffs
losses—because there was "nothing unreasonable . . . in the judge's taking the gross
tainted sales of [defendant] as not exceeding the sales of which [plaintiff] was capable,
had the interference not occurred." National Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 774-75; see
also Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1135 (interpreting National Merchandising as
awarding amount "roughly equal to the defendant's profits from commission of the tort
or the plaintiffs lost profits").
Likewise, in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d
683 (10th Cir. 1989), although awarding "restitutionary damages," the court did nothing
more than use the defendant's net gains as a proxy for plaintiffs losses. In that case, the
plaintiff and defendant were gas pipeline companies that entered into a servicing
agreement which required the plaintiff to sell to defendant specified quantities of gas.
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 661 F. Supp. 1448, 1456 (D.
Wyo. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 885 F.2d 683. The defendant breached its
contract by refusing to take the plaintiffs gas and the plaintiff was forced to relinquish
rights it had to purchase gas from a third party, Whitney Canyon. Id. at 1456-57. The
defendant then contracted with Whitney Canyon and sold Whitney Canyon gas to its
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customers. Id. at 1457. The court awarded to the plaintiff the defendant's net profits
from the sale of Whitney Canyon gas to the defendant's customers. Id. at 1478.
The damages award in Colorado Interstate was nothing more than an award to the
plaintiff of its lost profits from being unable to sell the Whitney Canyon gas. The
defendant bought exactly the same gas that the plaintiff would have purchased, and then
sold this gas at a profit. Colorado Interstate, 885 F.2d at 690. Defendant's gains from
these sales were equal to the lost profits the plaintiff would have made but for the
interference; thus, although couched in terms of "restitution," this case, too, exemplifies
the proper use of gains only as a proxy for the plaintiffs actual lost profits.
Finally, in Zippertubing Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 757 F.2d 1401 (3d Cir. 1985), the
amount awarded equaled the total amount of profit from a contract fulfilled by the
defendant that originally had been awarded to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs initially
contracted with a third party, NAB, to provide insulation for subway cars. Unable to
provide the insulation themselves, the plaintiffs contacted and came to terms with the
defendant for the insulation. The defendant subsequently contracted directly with NAB
to provide the insulation. Id. at 1404-06. The court awarded to the plaintiffs the actual
net profits that the defendant earned under the NAB contract. See id. at 1412. Because
the defendant took from the plaintiffs a specific customer and a specific contract, its
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profit was a reasonable estimate of the plaintiffs' lost profits. Thus, Zippertubing should
be viewed as awarding lost profits.

-l

In sum, each of these cases relied on by TruGreen confirms that lost profits are the
correct remedy for tortious interference.
4.

TruGreen's Cases Involve "Aggravated" Circumstances Not
Existing in the Present Case.

An additional basis to distinguish National Merchandising is its reliance on
"aggravated" circumstances in assessing damages. National Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d
at 776. The "aggravated circumstances" included the conscious encouragement of the
breach of a consent decree entered against other defendants. Id. at 775 (noting that
defendant "knowingly abetted the violation of a decree"). Thus, National Merchandising
awarded a punitive measure of damages. See also American Air Filter Co., Inc. v.
McNichol 527 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975) (limiting precedent relied on by plaintiff
because restitution or "accounting" was awarded "as a measure of punitive damages
because of the defendants' misconduct," and refusing to allow accounting to be measure
of damages for tortious interference).
Unlike National Merchandising, a punitive measure of damages is inappropriate
here, where the District Court expressly found as a matter of law:
7

See also Miller Medical Sales, Inc. v. Worstell, No. 93AP-23, 1993 Ohio App.
LEXIS 6251 (Dec. 21, 1993) (awarding damages based on defendant's gains on
employer's former customer's own accounts serviced by defendant in breach of covenant
not to compete); Try Hours, 2007 Ohio 1328,ffl|27-28 (overturning trial court's
exclusion of expert testimony of plaintiff s lost profits when expert determined plaintiffs
losses by looking at defendants' gains derived from plaintiffs own actual customers to
show lost profits).
18
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TruGreen has failed to demonstrate additional aggravating circumstances,
and the facts of this case are not so unusual or outrageous as to justify
punitive damages. Consequently, the court eliminates punitive damages as
a form of potential recovery for TruGreen.
R.253 (Feb. 18, 2006 Order) at 44. This case does not involve the violation of a decree or
other "aggravated circumstances" present in National Merchandising. As a result, that
holding is not persuasive here.
B,

Sound Policy Does Not Support Restitution as a Remedy for Tortious
Interference,
1.

This is Not a Trade Secret Misappropriation, Passing Off, or Trade
Name, Trade Mark, or Copyright Infringement Case.

The Court should reject TruGreen's attempt to analogize the proper remedy for
tortious interference to other torts that allow restitution. These other torts include
different interests that make them inapplicable to the narrow issue before the Court.
First, TruGreen tries to argue by analogy to a misappropriation of trade secrets
claim. However, the reach of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act is limited to protecting
information that fits the statutory definition of a "trade secret," and expressly preempts all
other analogous causes of action. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-8 (expressly displacing
all "tort, restitutionary, and other law of this state providing civil remedies for
misappropriation of trade secret"); see, e.g., Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van
Der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that "[u]nless defendants
misappropriated a (statutory) trade secret, they did no legal wrong"). To allow restitution
in circumstances "one step removed" from a trade secret, TruGreen Brief at 33, would
extend trade secret remedies beyond the point the legislature expressly intended.
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SLCJ40835

Next, TruGreen resorts to law governing tries to state a claim for passing off or
misappropriation of a trade name, trademark, or copyright. However, like trade secrets
misappropriation, claims for trade mark or copyright infringement have a statutorily
enacted remedy of restitution, which is not the case for common-law tortious
interference. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) ("[P]laintiff shall be entitled . . . to recover
defendant's profits" for trademark infringement); 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (allowing recovery
of the profits of an infringer in a patent infringement action).
Moreover, "palming off claims permit restitution because the gains from the
wrong closely approximate the plaintiffs actual harm—the benefit a party gains by
passing off a good as that of another equates to the amount of gain that the harmed party
would have received from selling its own goods. See, e.g., Forster Mfg. Co. v. CutterTower Co., 211 Mass. 219, 223 (1912) (noting that defendants' profits were recoverable
for palming off because it allowed defendant to gain "plaintiffs customers and trade")
(cited in National Merchandising, 348 N.E.2d at 775). This is not the case here, where
TruGreen has failed to show a correlation between its own alleged actual loss from its
departing customers and the remedy it seeks—Mower Brothers' entire gross revenues
from all sales to those same customers.
2.

TruGreen's Alleged Actual Damages Are Ascertainable, But
TruGreen Elected Not to Try and Prove Them.

TruGreen argues that it should be allowed restitution because it cannot prove its
damages, but there is no evidence that it could not prove damages—instead only that
TruGreen chose not to do so (presumably because it had not suffered lost profits as a
20
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result of respondents' alleged interference). TruGreen did claim lost profits early on in
the case—instructing its expert to rely on alleged lost income of TruGreen as opposed to
Mower Brothers' revenue. See R.255 at 9 and Ex. A (memorandum on plaintiffs
damages) (noting that TruGreen had done a "but for" calculation of decreases in
o

TruGreen's new sales and customers). Later in the case, in attempting unsuccessfully to
avoid summary judgment as to the lack of causation or damages, TruGreen inexplicably
abandoned this theory of damages to rely instead on respondents' gains. See TruGreen's
Brief at 4.
The District Court held, however, that actual damages could be calculated readily.
See R.l 12 at 6-7 (July 25, 2006 Order) ("[T]the court finds that the injury here is not
irreparable because TruGreen's damages can be calculated. Money damages, including
lost profits, attorney's fees, and costs associated with hiring and training new employees,
will place TruGreen in nearly the same position it would have been had the defendants
not violated their contracts."). TruGreen simply chose not to try to prove them, as
Respondents' expert painstakingly demonstrated and the Court found. See Expert
Report, R.240 at 99; Order, R.286 at 8; R.255 at 8 (June 8, 2007 Order) ("TruGreen has
failed to produce any evidence of what damage to TruGreen is attributable to any of the
Defendants."). Thus, as in Developers Three, where the plaintiff expressly disavowed a
lost profit theory of damages, the Court should hold that restitution is unavailable.

See R.240 at 19-22 (TruGreen's explanation for abandoning lost profits).
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3.

TruGreen Should Not Be Allowed to Seek as Restitution an Amount
Greater Than It Would Have Enjoyed Had There Been No Alleged
Breach.

Restitution or disgorgement is an improper remedy for tortious interference
because it could, and likely would, give TruGreen a substantial windfall. See Developers
Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1134; American Air Filter, 527 F.2d at 1300. TruGreen attempts to
avoid the windfall argument, see TruGreen Brief at 37, but ignores the undisputed fact
that it did not lose a single customer as a result of respondents' alleged interference. See
R.240 at 99 (uncontroverted expert opinion that that there was no customer crossover due
to alleged actions of respondents). Absent crossover of specific TruGreen customers,
Mower Brothers' profits or revenues are not TruGreen's losses. Any award to TruGreen
of Mower Brothers' gains would thus be a windfall, which Utah law does not recognize
as an appropriate remedy for tortious interference.
4.

Punitive Damages—Not Unjust Enrichment—Are the Appropriate
Means of Punishing Tortious Interference When Necessary.

Restitution or unjust enrichment remedies should not be used to "punish"
defendants for their torts. Like TruGreen, other plaintiffs often argue as a basis for
restitution "that an intending tortfeasor should not be prompted to speculate that his
profits might exceed the injured party's losses, thus encouraging commission of the tort."
Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1134. However, "an award of defendant's profits is not
the only means of discouraging a tortfeasor from interfering with a business relationship
while calculating that his profits will exceed the injured party's losses." Id.
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In some cases, a defendant's conduct will make him susceptible to punitive
damages. See id. at 1135, see also ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 260
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (noting that punitive damages are available for tortious interference
but upholding trial court's refusal of such damages). Punitive damages should "serve
well to counterbalance the unavailability of an unjust enrichment theory in tortious
interference." Developers Three, 582 N.E.2d at 1135; see also Marcus, Stowel & Beye
Govt. Sec., Inc. v. Jefferson Invest Corp.,, 797 F.2d 227, 232 (5th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he
jury's finding of actual malice entitled [plaintiff] to recover exemplary damage . . . .
Thus, where an interfering party's conduct is particularly egregious, Texas law provides a
device to deprive the wrongdoer of those profits obtained by the wrongful conduct.").
Rather than adopt a restitutionary remedy to deter wrongdoing, the Court should continue
to allow punitive damages, where appropriate, to serve such a role.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, respondents respectfully request that the Court resolve
the certified questions in the Order of Acceptance in the manner detailed in respondents'
opening brief.
DATED this 23rd day of January, 2008.
[ONES & PlNEGAR

Richard M. Hymas
J. Mark Gibb
Erik A. Olson
Jason R. Hull
Attorneys for Respondents
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Brian C. Johnson
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3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

24
SLC 140835

